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Article
Religious Accommodation at Work: Lessons from
Labor Law
CHARLOTTE GARDEN
When should employers be exempted from generally applicable law
because of their religious beliefs? Variations on this question have reached
the Supreme Court in a series of recent cases. But these high profile,
politically charged disputes represent only a subset of the religious
accommodation claims with which agencies and courts are grappling.
Other contexts yield useful insights about how we might strike a balance
between employer religious liberty and legal protections for third parties,
including employees.
This Article focuses on arguments by religiously affiliated colleges and
universities that they should be exempt from the National Labor Relations
Act. It begins by tracing the recent history of those arguments, and predicts
that they will enjoy a warmer reception from the Trump NLRB than they
did from the Obama Board. It then discusses how the legal dispute over
union organizing at religious institutions of higher education helps
illuminate aspects of the larger debate over religious liberty for
enterprises. First, this dispute illustrates courts’ difficulties in separating
questions about employer religious liberty from courts’ conceptions of
appropriate managerial prerogative. Second, it shows both that some
religious exemptions have significant value in secular markets, and when
that is true, employers may be able to negotiate accommodations that
partially compensate employees for the costs they incur as a result of
employer accommodations.

855

ARTICLE CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................857
I.

THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT AND RELIGIOUS
EMPLOYERS: AN OVERVIEW OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS ..859
A.
B.

THE GENESIS OF THE PACIFIC LUTHERAN UNIVERSITY STANDARD ...859
WHAT’S NEXT FOR UNION ORGANIZING AT RELIGIOUS COLLEGES
AND UNIVERSITIES? ........................................................................864

II. WHAT THE NLRA CONTEXT REVEALS ABOUT RELIGIOUS
ACCOMMODATIONS AT WORK .....................................................865
A.
B.

RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION AND EMPLOYER CONTROL ..............865
VALUABLE EXEMPTIONS & THE POSSIBILITY OF (PARTIALLY)
COMPENSATING EMPLOYEES FOR THEIR LOSS OF RIGHTS..............870

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................875

Religious Accommodation at Work: Lessons from
Labor Law
CHARLOTTE GARDEN *
INTRODUCTION
Three times in recent years, the U.S. Supreme Court has grappled with
clashes between generally applicable law and an enterprise’s religious
exercise—yet
many
thorny
questions
surrounding
religious
accommodations for enterprises remain. In Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v.
Colorado Civil Rights Commission, the Court held that the Commission
violated a baker’s First Amendment rights by conveying disrespect to his
religious beliefs, but did not resolve whether public accommodations laws
must ever yield to accommodate market participants’ religious beliefs.1
The other two cases falling into this category involved employers seeking
exemptions from their obligations under the Affordable Care Act. In
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, the Court held that under the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, certain companies were entitled to an exemption
from the “contraceptive mandate” based on the religious objections of their
owners, at least where the federal government had already devised an
accommodation available to some employers.2 And in Zubik v. Burwell, the
Court did not reach a decision; instead, it remanded the case so that the
parties could attempt to reach a satisfactory arrangement on their own.3
Although these cases illustrate only a narrow swath of the types of
cases related to religious exercise that reach the courts,4 they have captured
the majority of the public attention.5 This is at least in part because these
*
Associate Professor, Seattle University School of Law. I am grateful to participants in the
Religious Freedom: Liberty, Legislation, and Litigation symposium for their helpful feedback and
suggestions, to the editors of the Connecticut Law Review for their careful work on this essay, and to
Joseph Wright for his invaluable research assistance.
1
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
2
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759–60 (2014).
3
Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557, 1560 (2016) (“[T]he Court vacates the judgments below and
remands to the respective United States Courts of Appeals . . . . [T]he parties on remand should be
afforded an opportunity to arrive at an approach going forward that accommodates petitioners’
religious exercise while at the same time ensuring that women covered by petitioners’ health plans
‘receive full and equal health coverage, including contraceptive coverage.’” (quoting Supplemental
Brief for Respondent at 1, Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) (No. 14-1418))).
4
See, e.g., Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc1(a) (allowing prisoners to assert religious exercise claims).
5
See, e.g., Kathleen A. Brady, The Disappearance of Religion from Debates about Religious
Accommodation, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1093, 1096–97 (2017) (discussing the various types of
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cases also implicate sexual orientation, sexual autonomy, and women’s full
participation in the workforce. Still, as courts, legislatures, and the public
grapple with whether and when it is appropriate to accommodate corporate
religious exercise, it can be useful to consider a wider range of contexts in
which those questions arise. This Article attempts to do that by focusing on
arguments by religiously affiliated colleges and universities (RACUs) that
they should be exempt from the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).
Whether the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) may take
jurisdiction over bargaining units of educators working at RACUs has
become a contentious issue over the last several years, as unions like the
Service Employees International Union (SEIU) have sought to organize
adjunct professors, graduate students, and others at both secular and
religious schools.6 In 2014, the NLRB announced a new test for deciding
these questions, which no circuit court has yet reviewed.7 However, that
will soon change, and in any event, the NLRB under President Trump is
likely to revisit this test, should the opportunity arise.
This Article begins by tracing the recent history of the law governing
NLRB jurisdiction over educators working at RACUs and explains that
even though the Board’s new standard is relatively favorable to unions, it
is unlikely to be useful under the Trump NLRB. It then discusses three
ways that the legal dispute over union organizing at RACUs helps
illuminate aspects of the larger debate over religious liberty for enterprises.
First, it illustrates how difficult it is for the Court to separate employer and
employee religious liberty from ideas about the scope of employers’
authority. Second, it shows that some religious exemptions have significant
market value to the employers that seek them—a complicating factor that
is not necessarily present in every context in which corporations seek
religious accommodations. Third, it argues that while the Court’s approach
to religious exemptions to labor law does not now require exempt
employers to attempt to negotiate an accommodation that compensates
employees for their loss of statutory rights, there is reason to believe
employers and unions could succeed in in doing just that. Further, labor
law may be a context in which interested parties are relatively likely to be

challenges to accommodation laws, including contraception and same-sex marriage); Andrew
Koppleman, Kent Greenawalt, Defender of the Faith, 95 TEX. L. REV. 821, 821 (2017) (reviewing
KENT GREENAWALT, EXEMPTIONS: NECESSARY, JUSTIFIED, OR MISGUIDED? (2016)) (arguing that the
“coalition” in which “almost everybody loved the idea of exempting religious objectors from generally
applicable laws” was “splintered” by religious-based challenges to the contraceptive mandate and
public-accommodations laws).
6
Standing Up for Higher Education, SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION,
http://seiufacultyforward.org/ [https://perma.cc/P7SB-B9WZ] (last visited Feb. 10, 2018).
7
See infra notes 27–35 and accompanying text (describing the test adopted in Pacific Lutheran).
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able to negotiate a religious accommodation—though it is not a context in
which the Court has encouraged that outcome.
I.

THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT AND RELIGIOUS EMPLOYERS:
AN OVERVIEW OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

This Part begins with an overview of recent legal developments
regarding NLRB jurisdiction over religious colleges and universities,
focusing in particular on the Board’s recent decision in Pacific Lutheran
University. It then provides an overview of labor organizing at religious
colleges and universities, including related litigation following Pacific
Lutheran. Finally, it situates Pacific Lutheran against the Board’s history
of policy oscillation, observing that the newly configured Trump Board is
likely to revisit that case if given the opportunity.
A. The Genesis of the Pacific Lutheran University Standard
In recent years, the question of whether adjunct professors and others
who teach at RACUs may unionize has become important. This is in large
part because of the SEIU’s wide-ranging and often successful “Faculty
Forward” campaign to organize adjuncts, graduate students, and other
academic workers in higher education.8 This campaign responds to higher
education’s increasing reliance on adjunct and contingent faculty to deliver
core education to students at a cheaper price.9 The SEIU’s organizing
campaigns have tended to focus on two main components: first, pay and
benefits; and second, job predictability and stability.10
Colleges and universities have responded in a range of ways to
on-campus organizing drives. Some have waged public relations
campaigns aimed at encouraging their employees to vote against union
representation,11 and have also argued before the NLRB that their
8

See SERVICE EMPLOYEES, supra note 6 (noting that the group is advocating for change in the
education system); Justin Miller, When Adjuncts Go Union, AM. PROSPECT (June 30, 2015),
http://prospect.org/article/when-adjuncts-go-union [https://perma.cc/8MU6-WTY2] (describing SEIU’s
announcement of “a highly ambitious long-term plan to organize one million adjunct faculty members
nationwide”).
9
See Larry Gordon, California Colleges See Surge in Efforts to Unionize Adjunct Faculty, L.A.
TIMES (Jan. 3, 2015, 6:00PM) http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-me-unions-colleges-20150104story.html [https://perma.cc/G7MS-48VS] (stating that, according to William Herbert of the National
Center for the Study of Collective Bargaining in Higher Education and the Professions, at Hunter
College in New York, “[t]he unusual number of union campaigns springs from the use of more parttime instructors as a way to reduce the hiring of tenure-track faculty”).
10
See Colleen Flaherty, $15,000 Per Course?, SLATE (Feb. 12, 2015, 10:00 AM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/life/inside_higher_ed/2015/02/_15_000_per_course_the_seiu_s_faculty_
forward_sets_a_goal_for_adjunct_professor.html [https://perma.cc/9HNM-WV7T] (discussing the pay
per course that some instructors and professors are pushing for at some universities).
11
See Colleen Flaherty, For Your Anti-Union Information, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Aug. 30, 2016)
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2016/08/30/crop-anti-union-university-websites-sparks-
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employees are ineligible to unionize for a range of reasons. On the other
hand, some schools have maintained a neutral stance regarding the
possibility of their academic workers unionizing, and have successfully
negotiated collective bargaining agreements with elected unions.13
That same range of responses exists with respect to RACUs. For
example, Georgetown University did not oppose a union drive by its
adjunct professors, who then voted to be represented by an SEIU local
union and later successfully bargained their first contract with the
university;14 on the other hand, Georgetown is opposing a union drive by
its graduate students.15 In contrast, other RACUs have fought adjunct
union drives inside and outside the NLRB’s adjudicative process.16
However, a key difference between RACUs and secular private colleges
and universities is that only the former can argue that their religious
character should preclude the NLRB from taking jurisdiction over their
instructor workforces.
The scope of the NLRA’s application at religious colleges and
universities is governed at least in part by the Supreme Court decision
NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago.17 In that case, the Court relied on the
canon of constitutional avoidance to hold that the NLRB was not
authorized to take jurisdiction over a bargaining unit of lay teachers at a

criticism-proponents-graduate-assistant [https://perma.cc/79CQ-7DG4] (describing anti-union websites
hosted by universities facing union drives).
12
For example, Columbia University fought a union drive launched by the United Auto Workers
both by campaigning against the union over a prolonged period of time and arguing before the NLRB
that graduate student workers did not qualify as “employees” who are eligible to unionize under the
NLRA. The NLRB ruled against Columbia and the graduate students voted in favor of unionization;
Columbia is now in the process of appealing that decision. See Tr. of Columbia Univ. N.Y., 364
N.L.R.B. No. 90, 1–2 (Aug. 23, 2016) (holding that Columbia graduate assistants were employees
under the NLRA); Elizabeth A. Harris, Student Unionizing to Go to Court, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2018,
at A21 (describing Columbia’s litigation stance regarding graduate assistant unionization).
13
See Landmark Neutrality and Election Agreement for Barnard College Contingent Faculty,
UAW (July 20, 2015), http://uaw.org/landmark-neutrality-and-election-agreement-for-barnard-collegecontingent-faculty/ [https://perma.cc/W2X4-B4FE] (discussing that Barnard President Debora Spar
“pledge[d] to remain neutral . . . and encourage[d] everyone in the Barnard community . . . to also
remain neutral by refraining from campaigning for or against the Union”) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
14
Peter Schmidt, Georgetown U. Adjuncts Vote to Unionize, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (May 3,
2013), http://www.chronicle.com/article/Georgetown-U-Adjuncts-Vote-to/139069 [https://perma.cc/
3EEA-PCQA].
15
Colleen Flaherty, Graduate Students Protest Georgetown’s Position on Union, INSIDE HIGHER
ED. (Dec. 7, 2017), http://www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2017/12/07/graduate-students-protestgeorgetowns-position-union [https://perma.cc/TP77-M2ZT].
16
One of these schools is Seattle University, which is also my employer. Seattle Univ., 364
N.L.R.B. No. 84, 1–3 (Aug. 23, 2016).
17
440 U.S. 490 (1979). I have previously analyzed and critiqued Catholic Bishop, and I do not
repeat that discussion here. See generally Charlotte Garden, Religious Employers and Labor Law:
Bargaining in Good Faith?, 96 B.U. L. REV. 109 (2016).
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parochial high school. Thus, Catholic Bishop stands for the proposition
that there are at least some groups of employees of religiously affiliated
organizations as to whom the NLRB may not take jurisdiction, whether or
not the employer’s union opposition is motivated by religious or secular
considerations. Or, as the Catholic Bishop Court approvingly described the
Seventh Circuit’s reasoning below, “interference with management
prerogatives, found acceptable in an ordinary commercial setting, was not
acceptable in an area protected by the First Amendment.”19 In other words:
the First Amendment has a role in resolving the interplay between an
institution’s religious liberty and its management rights. Moreover, the
Seventh Circuit viewed the First Amendment as having a larger role in the
context of exemptions from labor law than from laws that implicated the
institution in other ways, such as in its role as owner and manager of a
piece of property or even its role as educator.20
Affirming the Seventh Circuit, the Supreme Court identified (but did
not resolve) constitutional questions about the application of the NLRA to
the parochial teachers. They included the risk of “entanglement” if the
NLRB ordered a parochial school to bargain collectively with its teachers
or adjudicated an unfair labor practice charge.21 Here, the Court was
focused not just on the outcome of those processes, but on “the very
process of inquiry leading to findings and conclusions.”22 Moreover, the
Court worried that the “introduction of a concept of mandatory collective
bargaining, regardless of how narrowly the scope of negotiation is defined,
necessarily represents an encroachment upon the former autonomous
position of management,”23 or that “conflicts” between “clergyadministrators” and “negotiators for unions” might arise.24
The Catholic Bishop Court did not provide clear guidance on whether
the NLRB should apply the same approach to other religiously affiliated
employers, such as hospitals or universities. As a result, the NLRB and the
circuit courts have struggled to apply Catholic Bishop in these contexts. I
have discussed the history of the Board’s application of Catholic Bishop to
other types of religious employers elsewhere.25 Suffice it to say, the
Board’s pre-2014 approach was imperfect and had been criticized by
18

Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 500–01, 506–07.
Id. at 496.
20
See id. (describing the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in which the “court distinguished local
regulations which required fire inspections or state laws mandating attendance, reasoning that they did
not ‘have the clear inhibiting potential upon the relationship between teachers and employers with
which the present Board order is directly concerned’”).
21
Id. at 502.
22
Id.
23
Id. at 503 (quoting Pa. Labor Relations Bd. v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 337 A.2d 262, 267
(Pa. 1975) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
24
Id.
25
Garden, supra note 17, at 120–24.
19
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circuit courts, which in turn had suggested other approaches with their own
problems.26
In 2014, a divided NLRB adopted a new standard to determine
whether to accept jurisdiction over faculty at religiously affiliated colleges
and universities in a decision known as Pacific Lutheran University.27
Under the Pacific Lutheran standard, the Board will accept jurisdiction
over faculty members who are otherwise eligible to unionize unless “the
university or college demonstrates, as a threshold matter, that it holds itself
out as providing a religious educational environment, and that it holds out
the petitioned-for faculty member[s] as performing a specific role in
creating or maintaining the school’s religious educational environment.”28
Both prongs of the new test reflect the Board majority’s
understanding—based on Catholic Bishop—that it would be
“impermissible” for the Board to inquire “into the good faith of the
university’s position [that it is a religious institution] or an examination of
how the university implements its religious mission.”29 Beyond that, the
first prong is aimed at helping the Board determine “whether First
Amendment concerns are even potentially implicated” in the case, and
demands only that the university make a “minimal showing” that it holds
itself out as religious in forums other than the NLRB.30 The Board’s
second prong focuses on whether the RACU holds out individual
instructors as playing a “specific role” in the school’s religious mission and
was derived from the Catholic Bishop Court’s focus on teachers’ “‘critical
and unique role’ in creating and sustaining a religious environment.”31
Thus, the Board drew a negative inference based on Catholic Bishop’s
reasoning, concluding that ordering bargaining or adjudicating unfair labor
practices in cases involving instructors who did not have a role to play in a
school’s religious mission could not raise entanglement concerns.32
26

Id.
Pac. Lutheran Univ., 361 N.L.R.B. 1404 (Dec. 16, 2014). This Article discusses only the
aspects of Pacific Lutheran that relate to NLRB jurisdiction over religiously affiliated colleges and
universities. It does not address questions related to when faculty members should be categorized as
“managerial” workers who are ineligible to unionize for that reason.
28
Id. at 1408.
29
Id. at 1409. The Board’s view on this point is consistent with Catholic Bishop, though courts in
other contexts assess whether individuals claiming entitlement to religious exemptions or
accommodations are sincere in their purported beliefs. See Garden, supra note 17, at 145–46
(describing the “difficulty of assessing whether subjective religious beliefs are sincere” in litigation).
30
Pac. Lutheran, 361 N.L.R.B. at 1409–10.
31
Id. at 1410–11 (quoting NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 501 (1979)).
32
Id. at 1411 (“Faculty members who are not expected to perform a specific role in creating or
maintaining the school’s religious educational environment are indistinguishable from faculty at
colleges and universities which do not identify themselves as religious institutions and which are
indisputably subject to the Board’s jurisdiction. Both faculty provide nonreligious instruction and are
hired, fired, and assessed under criteria that do not implicate religious considerations.”).
27
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However, the Board also concluded that its inquiry was restricted to
examining how the RACU described individual faculty members’ duties,
explaining that “if the college or university holds itself out as requiring its
faculty to conform to its religious doctrine or to particular religious tenets
or beliefs in a manner that is specifically linked to their duties as a faculty
member, we will decline jurisdiction.”33
In contrast, the two NLRB dissenters concluded that even the Board’s
limited and deferential inquiry into whether a RACU held out its faculty
members as playing a role in its religious mission was more than Catholic
Bishop allowed.34 Instead, they urged the Board to adhere to a test
previously announced by the D.C. Circuit, in which the Board would
decline jurisdiction over any institution that:
(a) holds itself out to students, faculty and community as
providing a religious educational environment; (b) is
organized as a nonprofit; and (c) is affiliated with, or
owned, operated, or controlled, directly or indirectly, by a
recognized religious organization, or with an entity,
membership of which is determined, at least in part, with
reference to religion.35
Shortly after it decided Pacific Lutheran, the Board applied the new
test in the context of adjunct union elections at other RACUs. 36 Parsing
how schools described individual instructors’ jobs, the Board in multiple
cases ultimately excluded instructors charged with teaching religious
doctrine from potential bargaining units, but accepted jurisdiction over
bargaining units involving instructors of other subjects.37
However, as the next Section discusses, the Pacific Lutheran standard
may be reversed by the Trump NLRB. Moreover, that danger is likely to
prompt unions hoping to organize instructors at RACUs to eschew the
NLRB election process for now, rendering the Pacific Lutheran standard
mostly unusable as a practical matter.

33

Id. at 1412.
Id. at 1430.
35
Id. at 1438 (citing Univ. of Great Falls v. NLRB, 278 F.3d 1335, 1347 (D.C. Cir. 2002)).
36
Seattle Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 84 (Aug. 23, 2016).
37
See, e.g., id. (holding that some of the faculty, like calculus teachers, do not perform a specific
religious function).
34
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B. What’s Next for Union Organizing at Religious Colleges and
Universities?
The NLRB has been routinely criticized for policy oscillation,38 a fact
of life that is probably inevitable given the role of partisan political
affiliation in filling Board seats and the fact that the text of the NLRA itself
leaves considerable room for interpretation.39 As NLRB seats come open,
recent custom dictates that President Trump will appoint replacements so
as to maintain three Republican and two Democratic members; as of the
date this article was published, the Board was comprised of three
Republican members and one Democratic member, with the remaining seat
vacant.40
With its change in partisan valance, the Trump NLRB is likely to
reverse Pacific Lutheran if given the chance. Already, the Board’s new
general counsel has called for new Board complaints that implicate “cases
[decided] over the last eight years that overruled precedent and involved
one or more dissents”—a category that includes cases applying the Pacific
Lutheran standard—to be “submitted to Advice.”41 Moreover, in the last
days of previous Board chairman Philip Miscimarra’s term, the Board
issued a flurry of cases overturning decisions from the Obama Board era
and even earlier.42
Given this political reality, unions are likely to conclude that
attempting to proceed under the Pacific Lutheran standard will do nothing
more than expend their own resources while giving the Trump Board an
38
See, e.g., Catherine L. Fisk & Deborah C. Malamud, The NLRB in Administrative Law Exile:
Problems with its Structure and Function and Suggestions for Reform, 58 DUKE L.J. 2013, 2015–16
(2009) (discussing how NLRB policy oscillation undermines the NLRB’s legitimacy as expert policy
maker).
39
Custom dictates that the president appoints three Board members from his own party and two
from the other party. Board members serve staggered five-year terms. See Ronald Turner, Ideological
Voting on the National Labor Relations Board Revisited (With Special Reference to
Decision-Bargaining Over Employer Relocation Decisions), 14 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 24, 29–30
(2014) (discussing the inevitably political appointment process and its impact on Board members).
40
Steven M. Swirsky, What to Look Out for This Year at the NLRB, NAT’L L. REV. (Feb. 6,
2018), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/what-to-look-out-year-nlrb [https://perma.cc/C3VT4ECR].
41
Memorandum from the Office of the General Counsel of the NLRB to All Regional Directors,
Officers-in-Charge,
and
Resident
Officers
at
1,
4–5
(Dec.
1,
2017),
http://hr.cch.com/ELD/GC18_02MandatorySubmissionstoAdvice.pdf [https://perma.cc/9A8W-V3XA].
“Submitting a case to Advice” means that the Office of the General Counsel has an opportunity to
direct that the Board’s prosecutorial arm take a particular position or argue the case in a particular way,
and it is often a first step in changing Board law.
42
See Andrew Strom, At the NLRB, GOP Board Members Show How to Play Hard Ball,
ONLABOR (Dec. 21, 2017), https://onlabor.org/at-the-nlrb-gop-board-members-show-how-to-playhard-ball/ [https://perma.cc/KYB4-75MM] (explaining that the new Republican majority on the NLRB
issued five decisions that overturned precedent).
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opportunity to overturn Pacific Lutheran. With little upside in sight, unions
are unlikely to file new petitions seeking to represent instructors at RACUs
and may withdraw existing petitions.43 Thus, even while Pacific Lutheran
remains on the books, it is likely to be close to a dead letter for as long as
the NLRB is controlled by Republicans.
This is not to say, however, that no organizing will occur at RACUs.
As noted above, some universities willingly agree to bargain collectively
with a union once a majority of their employees indicate their support for
that union without forcing an NLRB election.44 Thus, the Trump Board’s
near-certain hostility to Pacific Lutheran is likely to place a premium on
unions’ ability to convince employers to agree to remain neutral about the
prospect of union organizing and to agree to alternative election
procedures.45 Perhaps paradoxically, this means that the visibility of
unions’ work organizing instructors at RACUs could increase rather than
decrease, particularly on campuses where instructors and unions perceive
that a robust publicity campaign might prompt an employer to agree to
neutrality and an alternative election process.46
This Part has detailed the recent history of RACUs’ religious liberty
claims involving the NLRA. The next Part contains a brief discussion of
some ways that the fight over the application of the NLRA to religious
employers might help inform the ongoing debate about other forms of
religious accommodations for employers.
II. WHAT THE NLRA CONTEXT REVEALS ABOUT RELIGIOUS
ACCOMMODATIONS AT WORK
A. Religious Accommodations and Employer Control
Cases about religious accommodations for employers could be
recharacterized as cases about the scope of employer control.47 When
43
Indeed, the SEIU local union seeking to represent adjunct professors at Seattle University
withdrew its charge that the university was unlawfully refusing to bargain collectively after President
Trump was elected. SEIU Local 925’s Motion to Remand, Seattle Univ., Case 19-CA-185605 (NLRB
Oct. 18, 2017); Seattle Univ., NLRB (Jan. 5, 2018), https://www.nlrb.gov/case/19-CA-185605
[https://perma.cc/6HD5-GXWT].
44
See supra Part I.A (providing examples of schools that have engaged in collective bargaining).
45
See James J. Brudney, Neutrality Agreements and Card Check Recognition: Prospects for
Changing Paradigms, 90 IOWA L. REV. 819, 837–39 (2005) (exploring reasons employers might agree
to neutrality).
46
See James J. Brudney, Collateral Conflict: Employer Claims of RICO Extortion Against Union
Comprehensive Campaigns, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 731, 738–39 (2010) (identifying union incentives to
obtain neutrality agreements); Charlotte Garden, Labor Values Are First Amendment Values: Why
Union Comprehensive Campaigns Are Protected Speech, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2617, 2622 (2011)
(describing the role of comprehensive campaigns in union organizing).
47
See B. Jesse Hill, Kingdom Without End? The Inevitable Expansion of Religious Sovereignty
Claims, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1177, 1185 (2017) (arguing that Hobby Lobby “vindicated the
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employers successfully press religious liberty claims, the effect is
deregulatory48—certain employers are freed to exert control over or impose
conditions on their employees in ways that would otherwise be unlawful.49
Looking at these cases through this lens, readers can group religious
freedom cases involving employers with cases arising in other areas of law
(including labor law) that reflect explicit or implicit assumptions about
enterprises’ managerial prerogatives.50 Indeed, others have convincingly
pointed out that many aspects of labor law reflect courts’ assumptions
about the scope of legitimate employer control;51 religious accommodation
cases seem to reflect the same judicial impulse, at least in part.
For example, as described in the previous section, deference to
employer control is reflected in the way the Catholic Bishop Court
articulated its reasoning, including in its observation that collective
bargaining would “encroach[] upon the former autonomous position of
management.”52 That same impulse is also reflected in the handful of later
Supreme Court cases in which religious employers have successfully
claimed statutory or constitutional exemptions from certain minimum labor
standards based on their religious beliefs. (The primary exception, in which
an employer seeking a religious accommodation lost at the Supreme Court,
involved a religious employer seeking an exemption from the minimum
wage.53) In contrast, the Court’s cases involving religious accommodations
for employees have had far more mixed results.
Post-Catholic Bishop cases in which employers won their religious
exemption claims include Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos,54 and
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC,55 in
rights of religious employers to order their own internal affairs—to govern autonomously the terms of
their relationships with their employees”).
48
For a broader discussion of the deregulatory potential of corporate religious freedom
arguments, see Elizabeth Sepper, Free Exercise Lochnerism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1453, 1507–08
(2015) (observing the deregulatory potential of religious exemptions).
49
Id. at 1514–15 (discussing ways that Hobby Lobby’s rationale frees religious employers from
complying with statutory limits on their authority to make decisions regarding what benefits to provide
and who to hire or fire).
50
See, e.g., Catherine L. Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, Political Speech and Association Rights
After Knox v. SEIU, Local 1000, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1023, 1057 (2013) (noting that the Supreme
Court has, in some cases, privileged the free speech of enterprises over the free speech of their
dissenting members).
51
See, e.g., James Gray Pope, How American Workers Lost the Right to Strike, and Other Tales,
103 MICH. L. REV. 518, 518–19 (2004) (exploring assumptions in labor law that favor employers);
Richard Michael Fischl, Labor Law, the Left, and the Lure of the Market, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 947, 955–
56 (2011) (arguing that judges often reify employers’ perspectives).
52
NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 503 (1979).
53
Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985).
54
483 U.S. 327 (1987).
55
565 U.S. 171 (2012).
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addition to Hobby Lobby. The issue in Amos was whether Title VII’s
exemption for religious organizations violated the Establishment Clause,
particularly as applied to employment decisions involving employees who
had secular duties—in Amos, a building engineer employed at a
gymnasium that was open to the public.56 The Court held that Congress
could reasonably have decided to draw the exemption broadly in order to
remove from religious organizations the “significant burden” of
“predict[ing] which of its activities a secular court will consider
religious.”57 In other words, the Court upheld Congress’s decision to
extend Title VII’s statutory exemption to cover secular employees of
religious organizations because a narrower exemption might result in
litigation and therefore chill religious employers in their choice of
co-religionists for some jobs.
In Hosanna-Tabor, the Court held that the “ministerial exception” was
an affirmative defense to a ministerial employee’s discrimination lawsuit,
because churches had the right under both religion clauses to choose whom
to employ as their ministers.58 In that decision, the Court equated
managerial rights with the core of religious freedom, contrasting “outward
physical acts” such as religiously motivated peyote use, with employment
decisions that would “affect[] the faith and mission of the church itself.”59
Thus, while the Court recognized that both peyote use and hiring or firing a
ministerial employee could be motivated by religion, only the latter gives
rise to an exemption from generally applicable law, a distinction that has
been criticized by some commentators.60 Additionally, the Hosanna-Tabor
Court suggested the decision may not extend to employment eligibility
cases—as Christopher Lund puts it, cases implicating the relationship
between the employer and the government.61 Thus, whereas it is easy to
imagine a church arguing that its ability to hire a minister without work
authorization in the United States was an employment decision that
56
483 U.S. at 330–31, 333. Title VII’s exemption for religious organizations applies only to
discrimination based on religion, rather than other protected characteristics. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a)
(2012) (“This subchapter shall not apply to . . . a religious corporation, association,
educational institution, or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion
to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association,
educational institution, or society of its activities.”).
57
Amos, 483 U.S. at 336.
58
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 192.
59
Id. at 190.
60
See Leslie C. Griffin, The Sins of Hosanna-Tabor, 88 IND. L.J. 981, 984 (2013) (arguing that
“[i]t is unacceptable that religious individuals must obey the law but religious institutions need not”)
61
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 710 (“Nor, according to the Church, would the exception bar
government enforcement of general laws restricting eligibility for employment, because the exception
applies only to suits by or on behalf of ministers themselves.”); see Christopher C. Lund, Free Exercise
Reconceived: The Logic and Limits of Hosanna-Tabor, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1183, 1193 (2014); cf. Hill,
supra note 47, at 1191–92 (noting the high “cost of departure from religious employment”).
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implicated its “faith and mission,” the ministerial exemption likely does
not apply.62 In other words, employment law is different: whereas many
sorts of generally applicable laws may apply equally to churches as to
other institutions, employment law does not.
The exemptions in Catholic Bishop and Hosanna-Tabor have at least
two important similarities. First, neither the Catholic Bishop nor the
Hosanna-Tabor standard demands that employers attempting to qualify for
protection under either case actually state that an accommodation was
necessary because of a conflict between their religious beliefs and secular
law.63 Thus, a parochial school can avoid NLRB jurisdiction even if its
leadership does not believe there is a conflict between collective
bargaining and their religious commitments, and it can fire a ministerial
employee for no reason other than a desire not to pay the costs involved in
providing a reasonable accommodation that would otherwise be required
under the Americans with Disabilities Act. Second, in neither case did the
Court consider whether there was a way to compensate employees in part
for their lost statutory rights and protections—instead, the only choices for
employees who have lost statutory protections under either of these cases
are to grin and bear it or to quit.64
For another indication that ideas about the importance of employer
prerogative play at least an implicit role in religious accommodation
disputes, we might look to cases involving the religious exercise rights of
employees. That is, if norms about employer control influence
congressional or court decisions about the scope of religious
accommodations, then we would expect religious accommodations for
employees to be narrower than accommodations for employers. And
indeed, this is the case. Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act contains
protections for religious employees, including those who need an
accommodation because their religious practices are inconsistent with

62

Lund, supra note 61, at 1193 (arguing that the Court’s distinction is explained by the
employee’s consent to be treated according to church principles and decisions); see also Ashutosh
Bhagwat, Religious Associations: Hosanna-Tabor and the Instrumental Value of Religious Groups, 92
WASH. U. L. REV. 73, 95–96 (2014) (discussing the Hosanna-Tabor Court’s failure to offer a clear
explanation of the ministerial exemption’s boundaries).
63
NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 506 (1979) (concluding that Congress did not
intend an NLRA provision to apply to church-operated schools and articulating no conditions for
officials at church-operated schools to qualify for that exemption); Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 190–92
(determining that an employee qualified for the ministerial exemption by looking to “all the
circumstances of her employment,” rather than any communications made by the employee in pursuit
of an exemption).
64
Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 507 (rejecting extension of NLRB’s jurisdiction to
church-operated schools because that would implicate constitutional issues); Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S.
at 194 (noting that the relief sought “is precisely [the relief] that is barred by the ministerial
exception”).
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employer work rules. However, Title VII’s religious accommodation
provision applies only if the desired accommodation does not cause “undue
hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business,”66 and the Supreme
Court has held that an undue hardship includes anything that qualifies as
“more than a de minimis cost.”67 As others have observed, this is a major
limitation that sharply diminishes the usefulness of Title VII for religious
employees, in contrast to its broadly protective approach to religious
employers, as seen in Amos.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that there are limits to states’
abilities to compel employers to accommodate religious employees. In
Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, the Court struck down on Establishment
Clause grounds a Connecticut statute that gave every employee an absolute
right to refuse to work on his or her Sabbath.68 The Court’s reasoning
focused mainly on the burdens imposed on employers when employees
exercised their rights under the statute. For example, the Court wrote that:
There is no exception under the statute for special
circumstances, such as the Friday Sabbath observer
employed in an occupation with a Monday through Friday
schedule—a school teacher, for example; the statute provides
for no special consideration if a high percentage of an
employer’s work force asserts rights to the same Sabbath.
Moreover, there is no exception when honoring the dictates
of Sabbath observers would cause the employer substantial
economic burdens or when the employer’s compliance would
require the imposition of significant burdens on other
employees required to work in place of the Sabbath
observers. Finally, the statute allows for no consideration as
to whether the employer has made reasonable
accommodation proposals.69
In that passage (and elsewhere in the opinion), the Court mentions both
employers and nonadherent employees, seemingly expressing concern
about the statute’s effect on both groups. But closer inspection reveals that
the Court’s primary concern was the statute’s infringement on employers’
65

42 U.S.C. § 2000a-1 (2012).
Id. § 2000e(j).
67
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977) (“To require TWA to bear more
than a de minimis cost in order to give Hardison Saturdays off is an undue hardship.”); see also Dallan
F. Flake, Bearing Burdens: Religious Accommodations that Adversely Affect Coworker Morale,
76 OHIO ST. L.J. 169, 170–72 (2015) (discussing the de minimis standard); Dallan F. Flake, Image Is
Everything: Corporate Branding and Religious Accommodation in the Workplace, 163 U. PA. L. REV.
699, 718–19 (2015) (addressing inconsistent application of the de minimis standard).
68
472 U.S. 703, 710–11 (1985).
69
Id. at 709–10 (citations omitted).
66
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managerial prerogatives. First, there is the purpose of the statute itself,
which was concerned with limiting employers’ authority to fire workers at
will for a single reason: refusing to work on the Sabbath. It did not,
however, require employers to respond to that limitation by forcing
existing employees to cover for their Sabbath-observing coworkers;
instead, employers could have adjusted their opening hours or hired more
employees who were willing to work weekends. Second, each of the
burdens in the paragraph above is phrased in terms of restrictions or
inconveniences that befall employers, not employees; even where
employees are mentioned, it is in terms of the employer having to
“impose” significant burdens on them—a construction that brings to mind
an autocratic employer that adjusts to life under the statute by forcing
unwilling (but nonreligious) employees to work on their coworkers’
Sabbaths instead of taking any of the other available paths.
Taking these cases together, a picture emerges: where employers’
rights are concerned, Congress and the Supreme Court have been willing to
grant exemptions even at the cost of fundamental statutory protections for
employees. Conversely, where employees’ religious liberty rights are at
stake, the Court has interpreted narrowly or even struck down the relevant
statutes—again preserving employer control.70
B. Valuable Exemptions & the Possibility of (Partially) Compensating
Employees for Their Loss of Rights
Cases involving exemptions from NLRA coverage also help
demonstrate one way in which certain religious accommodations for
employers differ from one another: some are likely to make the employer
more competitive in the secular marketplace.71 This distinction implicates
both employers’ incentives to claim exemptions and the list of third parties
who are burdened by accommodations.
An accommodation in the form of an exemption from federal labor law
is a considerable deregulatory concession. It means not only freedom from
the obligation to bargain collectively with an elected labor union, but also
freedom to ignore statutory protections for employees’ concerted activity,
which apply whether or not those employees have voted to unionize. 72
Thus, unlike an employer who is subject to NLRB jurisdiction, an
employer who is exempt is free to punish or even fire employees who
discuss their own pay or other working conditions amongst themselves;
70
To be clear, this is not to say that employer control is the only explanation for these decisions,
but rather, simply to point out that it is a common thread running through them.
71
Cf. Matthew T. Bodie, Faith and the Firm, 60 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 609, 626-27 (2016) (“[T]he
stronger a corporation’s internal commitment to a religious, philosophical, political, or cultural mission,
the more such a corporation is differentiating itself . . . from the general norms of commerce.”).
72
29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012).
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who distribute union literature in nonworking areas during nonworking
time; who use their work-issued email addresses to discuss working
conditions or union organizing; or who go out on strike. Finally, there is
the union wage premium to consider—unionized employees tend to make
more than their nonunion counterparts,73 so the exemption from the
obligation to bargain collectively can mean cost savings for an employer.
In light of these consequences, it is easy to see why a hypothetical
employer—particularly a for-profit employer or one that operates in a
competitive marketplace—might be inclined to seek a religious exemption
from the NLRA.
This is one way an exemption from the NLRA is arguably different
than some of the other religious exemptions or accommodations discussed
in the Introduction to this Article. For the reasons listed in the previous
paragraph, employers have clearer financial incentives to seek an
exemption from NLRB jurisdiction than to seek other common types of
accommodations or exemptions. For example, an exemption from the
contraceptive mandate has an uncertain effect on employers’ or insurers’
costs,74 and refusing to include contraceptive coverage in employees’
benefits packages may prompt some consumers to boycott and others to go
out of their way to patronize an establishment.75 Likewise, an employer
that does not offer contraceptive coverage may have a more difficult time
recruiting qualified employees than the many employers that do offer
coverage.
In contrast, only a small minority of private sector employers are
unionized, and it is common for employers to overtly oppose employees’
collective action. That means an employer’s religious objection to NLRB
jurisdiction seems unlikely to place it at a competitive disadvantage
vis-à-vis many potential employees, even as it provides a competitive
advantage vis-à-vis other employers. As further evidence that at least some
employers would view an NLRA exemption as valuable, one need only
look to states in the southeastern United States, which sometimes tout their
73

BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., TABLE 2. MEDIAN WEEKLY EARNINGS OF FULL-TIME WAGE AND
WORKERS
BY
UNION
AFFILIATION
AND
SELECTED
CHARACTERISTICS,
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.t02.htm [https://perma.cc/93EY-K5UR] (last modified Jan.
19, 2018).
74
See Austin Frakt, Does Birth Control Coverage Pay for Itself?, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2014,
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/10/upshot/does-contraceptive-coverage-pay-for-itself.html
[https://perma.cc/8CYS-WEP4] (discussing the debate on whether “contraceptive coverage pays for
itself in the long term” from an insurer’s perspective).
75
This dynamic has repeatedly played out in recent years. See, e.g., Arselia Gates, Fill the Cart or
NEWS
(July
2014),
Boycott
Hobby
Lobby?,
DALL.
https://www.dallasnews.com/business/retail/2014/07/02/fill-the-cart-or-boycott-hobby-lobby
[https://perma.cc/5BB2-B9K9] (discussing how after the Hobby Lobby decision, some shoppers
mentioned that they would start shopping at Hobby Lobby’s competitors, while other shoppers
indicated support for or indifference to Hobby Lobby).
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relatively “union free” status as a basis to attract new business. Similarly,
the ministerial exception may be valuable to employers, even though it
applies only to a limited class of “ministerial” employees. That is, religious
employers can be sure that a decision to demote or fire a ministerial
employee will not lead to an expensive trial or an award of damages77—a
significant concession, as the Court seemed to recognize in its discussion
of litigation risk in Amos.
This means there are two groups that are potentially affected by
employer religious exemptions: employees, who lose the benefits of
statutory rights that they would otherwise have; and market competitors
that must comply with laws from which one or more religious competitors
are exempt. Although the latter group has not received much attention in
recent cases, potential effects on market competitors were part of the
reason the Court rejected the employer’s religious defense to its
noncompliance with the Federal Labor Standards Act (FLSA) in Alamo
Foundation.78 There, the petitioner was a religiously affiliated nonprofit
organization that operated several commercial establishments for the
purpose of funding its own religious activities.79 It employed “associates,”
whom the Court described as “drug addicts, derelicts, or criminals before
their conversion and rehabilitation by the Foundation.”80 In lieu of any
wage or salary, the Foundation provided these employees “food, clothing,
shelter, and other benefits.”81 Although the employees disavowed any
desire to be paid—they “considered themselves volunteers who were
working only for religious and evangelical reasons”82—the Court held that
the Foundation had violated the FLSA, rejecting its argument for an
exemption based on its religious character.83
Affirming the lower court’s rejection of the Foundation’s argument
that its “businesses function as ‘churches in disguise,’” the Court cited the
effect of an FLSA exemption on the Foundation’s competitors:
[T]he Foundation’s businesses serve the general public in
competition with ordinary commercial enterprises . . . and the
76
See, e.g., STANLEY ARONOWITZ, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF AMERICAN LABOR: TOWARD A NEW
WORKER’S MOVEMENT (2015) (observing that southern states “offer corporations lower wages and a
nonunion work environment,” among other incentives, and “foreign companies build their facilities in
these communities that offer a ‘union-free’ environment”); Ned Resnikoff, How Tenn. Politicians
Killed Volkswagen Unionization, MSNBC (Apr. 4, 2014), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/tennesseevolkswagen-chattanooga-union#51477 [https://perma.cc/4Q2H-9X3S] (discussing attempts by
Tennessee politicians to prevent employees at a Volkswagen plant from unionizing).
77
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 195 (2012).
78
Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985).
79
Id. at 292.
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Id.
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Id. at 293.
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Id. at 295–99.
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payment of substandard wages would undoubtedly give
petitioners and similar organizations an advantage over their
competitors. It is exactly this kind of ‘unfair method of
competition’ that the [FLSA] was intended to prevent . . . and
the admixture of religious motivations does not alter a
business’s effect on commerce.84
The statutory context and the fact that Alamo Foundation was an
enforcement action brought by the government made this case a
particularly good vehicle to highlight effects on competitors. That explains
why the Amos Court rejected a similar argument, observing that “[i]t is not
clear why appellees should have standing to represent the interests of
secular employers,” and that in any event, the religious employer
exemption in Title VII did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.85
However, the Amos Court did not deny that the scope of Title VII’s
religious exemption could have implications for competitors—rather, it
simply found that those implications did not make a legal difference, given
the case’s statutory context and procedural posture.
As these cases show, courts considering the scope of accommodations
for religious employers at least sometimes take into account competitors’
interests. Moreover, as I have argued, where employers are entitled to
religious exemptions or accommodations, they should be (and may be
legally required to be) structured narrowly in order to minimize the
burdens imposed on employees.86
In this regard, the NLRB cases show that at least some employers’
religious accommodation claims are amenable to solutions that partially
compensate employees for the costs they incur as a result of the
accommodation. This is ironic because, as discussed above, Catholic
Bishop does not require religious employers to compensate employees for
the loss of their NLRA rights at all—it is an example of what Henry
Chambers Jr. has characterized as the Supreme Court’s persistent failure to
“seriously consider employee rights as a counterbalance to the extension of
the employer’s free exercise rights” in recent employer free exercise
cases.87
I have previously argued that collective bargaining under the NLRA
provides a built-in structure for unions and employers to negotiate religious
84

Id. at 299.
Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483
U.S. 327, 339 n.16 (1987).
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86 COLO. L. REV. 1141, 1144 (2015); see also Elizabeth Sepper, Contraception and the Birth of
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accommodations in a way that both protects employers’ free exercise and
compensates employees for the loss of their statutory rights.88 That
discussion focused mainly on employers that objected to particular
collective bargaining outcomes, such as the possibility that a union would
call for the employer to provide contraceptive coverage. But a real-world
example shows that it can even be possible for unions and religious
employers to come together to negotiate an entire unionization and
collective bargaining structure that protects employers’ religious
commitments while also ensuring that employees have the option to
unionize and bargain collectively in a fashion that is reasonably similar
to—and in some ways more employee-friendly than—the NLRA.
In 2009, the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops and a group
of labor leaders produced a document entitled Respecting the Just Rights of
Workers: Guidance and Options for Catholic Health Care and Unions.89
The document, which was the product of lengthy discussions that took
place over the course of years, sets out a framework for union drives that
includes both broad statements of shared values and much more specific
expectations about acceptable and unacceptable employer and union tactics
during an organizing campaign.90 As former SEIU General Counsel Judith
Scott put it:
[The] document underscores the importance of respect for
both parties. It emphasizes that a code of conduct should be
worked out beyond the requirements of the National Labor
Relations Act to reflect the Catholic social teachings and to
promote a fair way in which workers can choose a union that
goes beyond the basic protections you get under current labor
law.91
This document reflects the sort of compromise that the Court seemed
to hope might ultimately resolve the disputes that gave rise to both Zubik
and Hobby Lobby, and for which some commentators have also expressed
support.92 It may seem surprising that it arose in the context of labor law,
where the Catholic Bishop approach leads to all-or-nothing exemptions
from NLRB jurisdiction and does not require religious employers to
88

Garden, supra note 17, at 158.
Respecting the Just Rights of Workers: Guidance and Options for Catholic Health Care and
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[https://perma.cc/6YRX-TYMV].
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See id. at 8–9 (discussing employer and union communications with employees during an
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Jack Ahern et al., The Future of Labor Plenary Panel Discussion, 50 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD.
149 (2011).
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attempt compromise with employees and their unions. But it is unlikely
that Catholic Bishop would apply to religious hospitals, and moreover,
labor law is structured so that two entities that are relatively equal in their
understanding of labor law and organizing strategies can sit across the
table from each other and hammer out an agreement. Importantly, the
Catholic hospital framework had only institutional signatories—employers
and unions—rather than individual employees, who likely would have
lacked the necessary legal and practical knowledge necessary to negotiate
meaningfully, and also would have been too numerous for negotiations to
be useful. That is, a degree of institutional longevity and expertise is
necessary to iron out a bargain regarding employer religious
accommodations. These conditions are not likely to be present where
individual employees or consumers will pay the price for a corporate
religious accommodation—a state of affairs that the Supreme Court
implicitly recognized in Zubik and Hobby Lobby by treating the
government (rather than affected employees) as the potential negotiating
partner of religious employers.
CONCLUSION
This Article’s goal has been to expand the parameters of the current
debate over corporate religious accommodations by adding labor law to the
discussion. To be sure, there are some key legal, practical, and contextual
differences between the labor law context and other more high-profile
contexts, including the ACA’s contraceptive coverage requirement.
However, these differences highlight important questions that arise across
different contexts, including the extent to which religious accommodation
law reflects or is in part driven by secular assumptions and values, and how
and when to encourage “compromise” accommodations that at least
partially compensate employees or others who bear the costs of religious
accommodations.
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